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Han Fei’s Enlightened Ruler
Alejandro Bárcenas
In this essay I will revise, based on the notion of the ‘enlightened ruler’ or mingzhu and
his critique of the literati of his time, the common belief that Han Fei was an amoralist
and an advocate of tyranny. Instead, I will argue that his writings are dedicated to
advising those who ought to rule in order to achieve the goal of a peaceful and stable
society framed by laws in accordance with the dao.
The sage who makes the laws effective in the state is always acting contrary to the
prevailing opinions of the age, but is in accord with the dao and excellence.1
Han Feizi, XIV
The interpretative literature on Han Fei has traditionally focused on criticizing his
political philosophy, generally accusing him of being the ‘staunchest possible sup-
ported of absolute power’ (Pines, 2013, p. 84). As a result, little to no effort has been
placed in trying to coherently construct his own philosophical perspective. For
instance, considering how much Han Fei has been judged for allegedly giving ‘evil
advice’ to rulers, there is surprisingly little effort dedicated to studying how he
conceived the possibility of an ideal monarch.2 Among other issues, Han Fei’s
criticism of the Confucian literati of his time has proven to be a significant factor
in the lack of interest that interpreters tend to show with regard to the Legalist’s
political vision.3 Because of the dominance played by Confucianism in China, begin-
ning early in the Han dynasty under the rule of Han Wudi (漢武帝),4 his legacy has
paid a lofty price: his ideas have been subject to considerable disdain and, in the ‘best’
cases, consigned to oblivion. When it comes to the research done in Western
languages, it seems that the lack of interest in Han Fei’s politics becomes even
more glaring with regard to his notion of the ideal ruler. Han Fei used a specific
term to refer to such a ruler—no doubt a term of great significance to him since it
appears in the text on over 90 occasions. Han Fei called his ideal ruler mingzhu (明
主), the ‘enlightened ruler’.5
In this essay I will revise, based on his notion of the ‘enlightened ruler’, the extent
to which Han Fei is supposed to have justified the use of power in accordance to the
idiosyncratic and manipulative will of the ruler or turned power into an end in itself.
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I will also ponder if it is really the case that for Han Fei, ‘his treatment [of the ruler] is
frequently driven by political ambitions rather than philosophical reflection’ (Lai,
2008, p. 173). In addition, I will call into question the idea that what Han Fei wrote is
just a ‘behavioral science’ (Schwartz, 1985, p. 321) or, even worse, that Han Fei
‘professed to have no use for morality whatsoever’ (Watson, 2003, p. 7) and conse-
quently wrote ‘an amoral science of statecraft’ (Graham, 1989, p. 267).6 Those
appreciations, instead of clarifying the intentions of his philosophical project, seem
to have led a number of interpreters to characterize Han Fei as an apologist of
tyranny.7
Learning from the Past
In order to understand the intellectual environment in which Han Fei developed his
idea of the ‘enlightened ruler’, I will begin by expounding in general terms the role of
the past as a model during the third century BCE in China. Han Fei’s writings seem
to transmit to the reader the sense that the issue of the meaning of the past was one of
great contention during his time (Goldin, 2008). However, this issue was not by any
means a new one: some two centuries earlier it had already become for Confucius one
of the pillars of his philosophy.
Confucius was particularly interested in the prosperous time of the Zhou dynasty
that began about the twelfth century BCE and lasted until about the eight century
BCE, when it lost its centralized government (Pines, 2002a, p. 3; Watson, 2003, p. 5).
Confucius, who lived about 250 years after the destruction of the central capital of the
Western Zhou, considered the Zhou dynasty superior to other previous dynasties.8
His repeated praise of the Zhou in the Analects guided his disciples in their attempt to
follow the master and apply the wisdom that gave prosperity and integrity to several
generations of rulers. With time a certain group of ‘officials’ or ‘literati’, known as shi
(士), who filled the middle and lower rank of the civil government became known as
ru (儒)9 for their concern in transmitting the culture of the Zhou. During the
following years, mastery of the Zhou rituals and texts became a valuable qualification
for public office.
Although after the time of Confucius this group of literati became loosely associated
with Confucianism,10 recent studies on the subject suggest that by the time of Han Fei
the ru included a quite broad spectrum of people, from experts in social life, discourse
and religious rituals to professional artists and advisors.11 In general, it seems that at
least a significant number of them became quite derailed from the original pursuit of
becoming accomplished (ren仁) to the extent that, in retrospect, they could hardly be
considered Confucian at all. For instance, as Cho-yun Hsu explains in his book Ancient
China in Transition, they had an attitude of strict respect for the past in which
‘tradition determined the criteria for propriety’ (Hsu, 1965, p. 154) and ‘innovation
and novelty were indeed seldom acclaimed’ (Hsu, 1965, p. 154). This attitude did not
have any of the openness advocated by Confucius himself (Ames, 1994, p. 3) and, Hsu
argues, it seemed to be inspired at least in part by the literati’s literal reading and
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utmost devotion to bronze inscriptions and certain stories from texts such as the Book
of Songs (Hsu, 1965, pp. 22–23).12 Han Fei showed particular concern with the
damaging effects to society brought by their corrupt personas and by their stubborn
repetition of past formulas since the actual applicability of their skills appeared to have
nothing to do with the pressing issues of the time.13
According to Kung-chuan Hsiao’s suggestion, the attitude of those in that period
who ‘observed the vast and unprecedented transformations underway in society and
who tried to devise positive responses during this time’ (Hsiao, 1979, p. 378) can be,
in broad terms, divided into two groups. The first group—formed by scholars of
diverse tendencies—regretted the fall of the feudal order of the Zhou and wished to
rescue or recreate it in some form or another. The other group, to which Han Fei
seemed to belong, ‘observed that the feudal order was not worth saving and was
already ready to let it wither away’ (Hsiao, 1979, p. 378). But the issue at hand seems
to be more complex than Hsiao’s simple, but useful, categorization. The separation
into two completely different groups is not entirely accurate. First, it is important to
realize that for Han Fei not everything from the time of the Zhou needed to vanish.
As the Legalist philosopher explained in chapter XVIII:
Whether or not ancient standards should be changed, whether or not established
standards should be removed, all depends upon the question whether or not they
are still useful for the present.14
As this passage shows, it is possible to argue that, for Han Fei, the Zhou legal
foundation did not need to disappear entirely, but rather become actualized according
to the current circumstances. In effect it is quite possible, as Hsiao also argued, that
Han Fei’s entire Legalist philosophy might have been inspired by a whole body of
thought concerned with governing by laws that had its origins during the Zhou
period (Hsiao, 1979, pp. 376–377).
By the late third century BCE it seemed from Han Fei’s point of view as if the
ru, despite their best efforts, had failed to find or educate those people capable of
realizing a society inspired by the Zhou institutions. Han Fei felt that the literati
had plenty of opportunities to apply their ideas and address the social and
political problems of the time. His assessment was that, not only had they failed,
but also time appeared to be running out for civilized society before violence and
chaos became completely unmanageable. There is a sense of urgency in Han Fei
that seems to leave him without any patience to concede more time to the
scholars who had become a common sight in the courts of the states that
comprised China at the time.
In this regard, Han Fei’s ideas originated, to a great extent, as a response to the
failure of the literati to apply the model of the Zhou society and of ancient kings to
the political circumstances of the period. While the institutions and the moral fabric
of the society continued to decay, it appears that the literati succumbed to the mistake
of turning the pursuit of the ‘traditional Zhou cultural forms’15 into an end in itself.
Han Fei was critical of this inflexible stance because it had become stagnant and, thus
incapable of adapting to the always-changing circumstances.
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Only those who have no understanding of effective government always say ‘do not
change traditions, do not change what is established’. Change or no change, the
sage does not listen [to those with no understanding], for he aims only at the
rectification of government.16
In order to further clarify his criticism of those whom he considered to have ‘no
understanding’ of how to rectify government, because they had shown themselves
incapable of adapting to the political needs of the day, Han Fei tells a story about a
farmer who abandons his everyday duties, wishing instead that an unusual moment
of luck could strike twice.
A man from Song was plowing his field, in which there was a stump. A rabbit ran
through the field and crashed into the stump, breaking its neck and dying. From
then on, the man laid aside his plow and kept watch over the stump, hoping that he
would get another rabbit. But he got no more rabbits in this way, and was the
laughingstock of Song. If one desires to use the government of the ancient rulers to
effectively govern (zhi治) the people of today, one would be doing the same as the
man from Song who watched the stump.17
Taking into consideration the intellectual background, the point of the passage is
quite clear. Han Fei used a metaphorical critique of the literati’s attitude of the
time to mock those who naively thought that history could repeat itself in the
same exact way. For a careful student of the past, such as Han Fei, the thought
that an event could happen in the exact same way in two different periods was a
sign of unfamiliarity with the processual nature of historical events. Historical
records showed that just because an event occurred once in history, it did not
mean that it could do so again in the same way. In other words, there was no
chance that a prosperous dynasty (like the Zhou) could reemerge spontaneously
through the blind replication of its institutions and customs. So, if the literati
thought that history behaved as a series of events designed by luck, they were
leading society into disaster.
Like the man from Song, for Han Fei, the literati of the time were just preaching a
blind repetition of the past, and were not concerned with a careful investigation of the
social and political situation at hand. They had learned a series of set formulas and
simply did not know how to adapt and act intelligently according to the changing
circumstances.
In fact, in another passage Han Fei seems to remind the scholars of his time that
they have forgotten a key teaching from their self-proclaimed master: the intrinsic
mutability of everything in the world and the need to be in harmony with it. It
seemed to Han Fei as if they had forgotten that dao ‘denotes the active project of
“road building”’ (Ames & Rosemont, 1998, p. 45)18 and not traveling a road made by
others. This means that ideas, like everything else, need to develop if they are to be
effectively applied in a world of ‘silent transformations’.19 Han Fei seems to remind
the scholars that such notions—those that are effectively applied—need to be in
harmony with the dao, but when they are alienated from reality, because its histori-
cally defined content is not comprehended, they only lead to chaos. In chapter LI, he
wrote:
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All under the heavens affirm the dao of filial piety (xiao 孝), fraternal respect (ti
悌), loyalty (zhong 忠), and obedience (shun 順) but none of them understand to
probe into it and to practice it critically; therefore, all under the heavens is in
chaos.20
Given the desperate times of the Warring States period, failure to adapt was more
than just a simple and harmless blunder. The actual situation was becoming more
desperate by the day, as society itself faced utter disintegration. The literati continued
to show that they lacked the capability to reflect and consider the foundational
notions of a society and kept hoping for a return of the Zhou order. Their advice
had become repetitive and lacked the necessary insight to conform to the changing
circumstances; hence, it had become clear for Han Fei that the literati had lost touch
with the political needs of their time.
Furthermore, Han Fei observed in another passage that they had become afraid of
change and continued to mindlessly apply failed policies that, in the best of cases, did
little more than serve the immediate satisfaction of the people and their rulers.
However, one could understand why the literati would prefer to cling to one set of
standards with considerable devotion when the general feeling of the time was that
‘the standard of true and false ceased to exist, so that the permissible and the non-
permissible fluctuated from day to day’ (Hsiao, 1979, p. 369). In this regard, they felt
as the guardians and providers of stability for a time characterized by contingency. As
Hsü explains, they were hoping that ‘if time had stood still the upper elements of the
structure would have retained their conviction of divinely granted superiority, and the
lower elements would have had to accept their lot ungrudgingly’ (Hsu, 1965, pp. 22–
23). In effect, it seems that they got so accustomed to proposing principles and
institutions already familiar to them that they behaved as if they did not care about
the consequences of applying them to the present, in spite of the fact that the
historical circumstances had changed.
Those who are against changing the ancient traditions do so because they dread
affecting the stability of the people. Those who do not change the ancient traditions
are following on in the footsteps of chaos. Those who only satisfy the people’s
feelings encourage unrestrained vices. Obtuse people do not understand what leads
to chaos, and if the ruler is weak and cannot implement change, this leads to the
failure of the effective government (治 zhi). Enlightened rulers are able to under-
stand the conditions of effective government. Their constancy is such that they are
able to implement an effective government even if it goes against the feelings of the
people.21
The harsh reality of the third century BCE was that the ancient institutions and
therefore their social customs (li禮) continued to disintegrate in spite of the scholars’
best efforts. For Han Fei, if a new age of prosperity was ever to return to the land, it
needed to be formulated not just as a state of things that perhaps could occur in the
future, but in a way that could be applied in the present conditions of war and
disorder.
Even if a society based on Confucius’ ideas was possible, the fact was that it
required time to grow and develop, but time had passed by and little had changed.
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Two centuries before Han Fei’s era, even Confucius himself admitted that, ‘it would
take one hundred years if truly efficacious people (shanren 善人) were in charge of
government to be able to overcome violence and dispense with killing altogether.’22
Han Fei realized that even after all this time, ‘among one hundred people there is not
even one who would practice a conduct of high level.’23 Hence, there was no reason
for a society to continue following a path that only led to failure and, from his point
of view, would continued to do so. The nature of the whole political enterprise needed
to shift.
During those 200 years between the death of Confucius and Han Fei’s time, the
collapse of the Zhou feudalism gave way to a new set of powerful local feudal lords
who did not belong to the ancient hereditary noble families. Those new feudal lords
began an aggressive campaign of war and annexation among neighboring states.
Among those states, the land of Qin accumulated more military might than any
other state and by the third century BCE Han Fei’s home territory, the state of Han
(韓) as well as many others, faced utter destruction. In other words, neither Han Fei
nor the people from his land could afford to wait ‘one hundred years’ to achieve peace
and prosperity.
In this regard, it is quite possible that Han Fei felt the same way toward the ideal of
a Confucian society as Aristotle did toward Plato’s inability to make the ‘best city’
(ἄριστος πολιτεία).24 a political reality. Aristotle clarified in the Politics that it was not
enough to be able to formulate in theory the best society, but not know how to
achieve its realization:
For the best city is often unattainable, and therefore the true legislator and states-
man ought to be acquainted, not only with what is best in the abstract, but also with
that which is best relative to circumstances.25
Rhetoric and Private Interests (si 私)
The failure of the ru to make their view of society a reality was manifested by the
advice given by them to the rulers and their courts. Han Fei saw the literati of his time
as consumed by the pursuit of their private interests (si 私). As a consequence, they
were showing a pervasive disregard for any formulation of standards that could limit
their self-centered enterprise. ‘Most ministers of today defend their private (si 私)
ideas,’ Han Fei complained, ‘they do not follow the law, regard wickedness as wisdom
and establish their own interests beyond the boundary of the law. To restrict such
conduct, is the dao of the ruler.’26
In time, the pursuit of private interests made the literati turn their backs on the
people they were supposed to help according to the teachings of Confucius, and, in
addition, made them disloyal to the government they were expected to serve. A
consequence of the private pursuits of the literati, François Jullien writes, was that
‘individual knowledge is doomed to remain fragmentary, incomplete and therefore
tainted by subjectivity’ (Jullien, 1992, pp. 45–46). As Jullien explains, the literati’s self-
centeredness made them ‘fragmentary’ and, therefore, alienated from the overall good
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